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A TORAHIC CASE AGAINST SJR8 
Josh Burk* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Arkansas is home to people of faith. According to a 2014 Pew Survey, 
79% of Arkansans classify themselves as affiliated with Christianity.1 Be-
yond mere affiliation, 45% of Arkansans believe that the Bible should be 
taken literally, and another 28 % think at least parts of it should be.2 Anec-
dotally, a person would be hard-pressed to find an Arkansan without at least 
some affiliation with a neighborhood church. 
This deep connection to faith was fundamental in the formation of the 
Arkansas government.3 To celebrate the state’s Judeo-Christian heritage,4 
the Arkansas General Assembly passed Act 1231 of 2015 for “The Place-
ment of a Ten Commandments Monument Display on the State Capitol 
Grounds.”5 The lead sponsor of the legislation, State Senator Jason Rapert, 
stated about the monument, “[w]e have beautiful Capitol grounds but we did 
not have a monument that actually honored the historical moral foundation 
of [our] law.”6 The Act itself contains the following language: 
The Ten Commandments, found in the Bible at Exodus 20:1–17 and 
Deuteronomy 5:6–21, are an important component of the moral founda-
tion of the laws and legal system of the United States of America and of 
 
* Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Lavenski R. Smith, Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 2016–17 term; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 
2016; B.A., Ouachita Baptist University, 2007, Mass Communications. 
 
 1. Religious Composition of Adults in Arkansas, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/arkansas/ (last visited Jan. 5, 
2018). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. Both Judaism and Christianity share a common belief in the divine nature of Mosaic 
Law. For a discussion of the modern acceptance of the term “Judeo-Christian” and its deriva-
tives, see generally Mark Silk, Notes on the Judeo-Christian Tradition in America, 36 AM. Q. 
65 (1984). 
 5. An Act Concerning the Placement of a Ten Commandments Monument Display on 
the State Capitol Grounds; and for Other Purposes, No. 1231, 2015 Ark. Acts 5725–28 (codi-
fied at ARK. CODE ANN. § 22-3-221 (Repl. 2016)) [hereinafter Act 1231]. 
 6. Laurel Wamsley, Ten Commandments Installed at Arkansas State Capitol; ACLU 
Plans Lawsuit, NPR (Jun. 27, 2017, 7:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2017/06/27/534558892/ten-commandments-installed-at-arkansas-state-capitol-aclu-plans-
lawsuit. 
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the State of Arkansas; . . . [t]he Ten Commandments represent a philoso-
phy of government held by many of the founders of this nation and by 
many Arkansans and other Americans today . . . .7 
Act 1231 paved the way for a six-foot tall, granite monument of the 
Ten Commandments to be erected on the Capitol grounds in June 2017.8 
This monument demonstrates that Torahic9 law forms the bedrock of the 
moral beliefs and social edicts of the average Arkansan. This Torahic herit-
age underpins the foundation of the Arkansas government—including its 
state legal system.10 The Arkansas Constitution in its Preamble provides: 
“We, the People of the State of Arkansas, grateful to Almighty God for the 
privilege of choosing our own form of government; for our civil and reli-
gious liberty; and desiring to perpetuate its blessings, and secure the same to 
our selves and posterity; do ordain and establish this Constitution.”11 With 
this endowment, the constitution continues with the basic rights of Arkan-
sans.12 One such right is that of a jury trial: “The right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate.”13 
In the 2018 general election, Arkansans will vote on new “tort reform” 
legislation via a referendum on Senate Joint Resolution 8 (“SJR8”), a pro-
posed constitutional amendment.14 If enacted, SJR8 will do three things: (1) 
limit attorney contingency fees to 33.3%; (2) limit non-compensatory and 
punitive damages to $500,000 in personal injury cases; and (3) remove the 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s ability to amend the Arkansas Rules of Civil 
Procedure and place this power in the hands of the legislature.15 The follow-
ing essay will examine these changes in light of the Torahic principles at the 
foundation of the Arkansas Constitution. Rather than establish a system of 
just compensation as demanded by these foundational ideals, I argue that 
SJR8 will effectively place a cap on compensatory damages by diverting a 
 
 7. Act 1231, supra note 5, at § 1. 
 8. Act 1231, supra note 5, at § 1. Although this monument was knocked down on June 
28, 2017, the legislative reasoning and purpose of the monument continue to be relevant to 
this essay. In July, it was announced that the monument will be rebuilt using money donated 
by the producers of the God’s Not Dead film series. Anugrah Kumar, Pure Flix Gives 
$25,000 to Rebuild Ten Commandments Monument Destroyed in Arkansas, CHRISTIAN POST 
(July 8, 2017), http://www.christianpost.com/news/pure-flix-gives-25000-rebuild-ten-
commandments-monument-destroyed-arkansas-191310/. 
 9. The Torah generally connotes the first five books of the Bible or the Pentateuch. For 
purposes of this essay, Torahic refers to the principles and edicts found in the Torah. 
 10. Act 1231, supra note 5. 
 11. ARK. CONST. pmbl. 
 12. See id. art. II. 
 13. Id. art. II, § 7. Arkansas’s first constitution contains identical language, see ARK. 
CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 6. 
 14. S.J. Res. 8, 91st Leg. (Ark. 2017) [hereinafter SJR8]. 
 15. Id. 
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plaintiff’s recovery to pay for attorneys’ fees and by limiting working-class 
families’ ability to access courts. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Arkansas Constitution is unabashedly rooted in Torahic law.16 Ac-
cording to Christian tradition, the God of the Israelites spoke to Moses in the 
wilderness and laid out rules governing the Israelites’ everyday lives.17 The 
Torah recounts a broad swath of edicts given by God, from the Ten Com-
mandments to regulations regarding sexuality.18 These religious rules even 
include rudimentary tort and criminal regulations (although no distinction is 
made between the two), for example: 
If anyone injures his neighbor, as he has done it shall be done to him, 
fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; whatever injury he has 
given a person shall be given to him. Whoever kills an animal shall make 
it good, and whoever kills a person shall be put to death.19 
According to the Talmud,20 the “eye for an eye” rule (lex talionis or 
ayin tachat ayin)21 was not to be taken literally but to stand for the principle 
of just compensation.22 This foundation continues to underlie the core of our 
modern notions of justice.23 If a person injures you or your property, that 
person should be liable to pay you back for the costs of that injury.24 This is 
not controversial, and the right to just compensation establishes our entire 
civil justice system.25 
 
 16. The Arkansas Constitution’s invocation of the phrase “Almighty God” in its pream-
ble, references a widely accepted moniker of the Torahic God. See HERBERT LOCKYER, ALL 
THE DIVINE NAMES AND TITLES IN THE BIBLE 12 (1988) (referencing the Hebrew term El 
Shaddai as “Almighty God” in English). 
 17. See Exodus 21–25. 
 18. Id.; see also Leviticus 18:6–29. 
 19. Leviticus 24:19–21 (English Standard Version). 
 20. “The Talmud is a collection of records of academic discussion, homiletical exposi-
tion and judicial administration of Jewish Law by generations of scholars during several 
centuries after 200 c.e.” Chaim Saiman, Jesus’ Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & 
RELIGION 97, 130 n.18 (2007). 
 21. Lex talionis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Esor Ben-Sorek, Ayin 
Tachat Ayin . . . An Eye for an Eye, TIMES OF ISR.: THE BLOGS (July 1, 2016), http://blogs.
timesofisrael.com/ayin-tachat-ayin-an-eye-for-an-eye-plus/. 
 22. See Bernard S. Jackson, Models in Legal History: The Case of Biblical Law, 18 J.L. 
& RELIGION 1, 18–22 (2002) (discussing the Talmudic interpretation of lex talionis). 
 23. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Normative Source of 
Modern Tort Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1517 (2016). 
 24. Id. at 1561. 
 25. Id. at 1564 (“[M]odern tort law has continued to develop the talionic reciprocity 
norms that first defined the early common law.”). 
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To determine the recompense necessary to hold the tortfeasor account-
able for putting out his neighbor’s “eye,” the Arkansas Constitution’s ratifi-
ers adopted the jury system as a pathway for allowing community members 
to determine the value of an injury so that neighbors could make amends.26 
Rules of evidence and procedure were introduced to ensure fairness.27 These 
legal rules, however, fundamentally require a familiarity that the average 
Arkansan lacks.28 Thus, for effective advocacy in court, an Arkansan must 
hire an attorney.29 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[f]ull-
fledged representation in a battle before a court or agency requires profes-
sional skills that laymen lack; and therefore the client suffers, perhaps 
grievously, if he is not represented by a lawyer.”30 
Attorneys in Arkansas help the working-class, lower-income litigants, 
and those unfamiliar with the legal world, by fighting for justice on their 
behalf.31 Lawyers are so essential to the fundamental fairness of the system 
that the federal constitution requires them in criminal cases “at the critical 
stage when [a defendant’s] guilt or innocence of the charged crime is decid-
ed and his vulnerability to imprisonment is determined.”32 In such cases, the 
government pays the wages of the advocate to ensure the tribunal’s fair-
ness.33 This is not true for civil cases.34 Representation of those unable to 
 
 26. See ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7. 
 27. “From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid 
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before 
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.” Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 28. Beyond awareness of the nuances of the Rules of Evidence or Pleading Standards, 
the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study conducted by the American Bar Association showed 
that between 61–71% of the legal issues confronted by low and middle-income families do 
not even reach the courthouse steps, partially due to survey respondents’ unfamiliarity with 
the basic functioning of the legal system. AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: 
A SURVEY OF AMERICANS 28 (1994) [hereinafter LEGAL NEEDS]. 
 29. “Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law . . . [he] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him.” Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 
(1932)). When low or middle-income families were able to obtain legal counsel, a large ma-
jority were completely satisfied with most aspects of the performance of the lawyers in-
volved. See LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 28, at 24. 
 30. Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 149 (1967). 
 31. E.g., Who We Are, LEGAL AID OF ARK., http://arlegalaid.org/who-we-
are/mission.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (“Our mission is to improve the lives of low-
income Arkansans by championing equal access to justice for all regardless of economic or 
social circumstances.”). 
 32. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“[I]n our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious 
truth.”). 
 34. See LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 28. 
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afford lawyers is often lacking in the non-criminal arena.35 As a matter of 
practice, when Arkansans cannot pay lawyers to advocate their cases out-
right, they bargain with attorneys to pay their wages on contingency fees, 
meaning the lawyers get paid only if the client does as well.36 Even still, this 
contingency fee system does not solve the need for lawyers in all civil cases, 
evidenced by the 2003 Arkansas State Bar Association report suggesting a 
substantial need for lawyers in the civil law setting to help the low-income 
citizens of Arkansas.37 In response, the Arkansas Supreme Court created the 
Arkansas Access to Justice Commission to help find solutions to the prob-
lem.38 
Beyond its rules of fairness, Arkansas’s legal system affords mecha-
nisms to prevent frivolous claims and excessive awards. For example, Ar-
kansas Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides a litigation defense 
against claims that fail “to state facts upon which relief can be granted.”39 
This is a higher standard of pleading than that required by the Federal 
Rules.40 Further, Arkansas rules and case law compel the state courts to limit 
excessive jury awards through remittitur.41 This remedy dates back to 1841 
and can be applied to both compensatory and punitive damages.42 Thus, Ar-
kansas’s legal system, from its inception, has provided remedies commensu-
rate with its Judeo-Christian ideologies of justice and fairness,43 allowing 
only legitimate claims in the courthouse and preventing jury awards in ex-
cess of a just amount. The system is designed to keep unscrupulous lawyers 
from lining their pockets at the cost of business and economic growth.44 If 
 
 35. See supra note 28. 
 36. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of 
Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 231 (1998). 
 37. See In re Ark. Bar Ass’n, 178 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Ark. 2003) (“While there are no 
comprehensive studies of the unmet civil legal needs of poor and near poor Arkansans, case 
data from Arkansas’ two legal services providers suggest the unmet need is substantial.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 40. “Arkansas has adopted a clear standard to require fact pleading, which is deemed to 
be a higher standard by which the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint is tested.” 
McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-CV-00179 KGB, 2017 WL 1381663, at *20 (E.D. Ark. 
Apr. 15, 2017). 
 41. See Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 47, 111 S.W.3d 346, 355–56 (2003). 
 42. Id.,111 S.W.3d at 355–56. 
 43. “Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the poor or favoritism to the great, 
but judge your neighbor fairly.” Leviticus 19:15 (New International Version); see also Isaiah 
61:8–9 (New International Version) (“For I, the Lord, love justice; I hate robbery and wrong-
doing . . . .”). 
 44. There exists in the American legal system an unconscious bias against individuals 
profiting from the legal troubles of others, regardless of how meritorious the claims. See 
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (2011). 
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our current judicial system represents the religious values of the people as 
described above, what role does tort reform legislation play in this picture? 
III. ARGUMENT 
For personal injury cases, SJR8 limits non-economic and punitive 
damages to $500,000.45 For those unfamiliar with damages terminology—or 
like me, have long-since forgotten the basic tenets of first-year Tort Law—
this cap does not include compensatory damages, like medical bills or other 
economic losses, but rather limits damages like pain and suffering or loss of 
companionship.46 At first blush, restrictions on non-economic and punitive 
damages seem consistent with the Judeo-Christian principle of just compen-
sation.47 One could argue that SJR8 is simply a prophylactic measure against 
unethical personal injury attorneys and ridiculous jury verdicts at the ex-
pense of Arkansas businesses: No million dollar jury awards for spilled cof-
fee—Arkansans have had enough. 
This reasoning, however, may be somewhat deceptive. As a practical 
matter, non-economic damages help working- and lower-class litigants cov-
er the expense of hiring an attorney.48 Personal injury lawyers take on cases 
under contingency fees49 because many plaintiffs cannot pay otherwise.50 
 
 45. SJR8, supra note 14. 
 46. See Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 335–36, 651 S.W.2d 453, 457–58 (1983) 
(distinguishing medical expenses, loss of earnings, physical disfigurement, and mental an-
guish as separate elements of damages); but see Wilson v. Martin, 2016 Ark. 334, at *9, 500 
S.W.3d 160, 167 (rejecting a similar ballot proposal for lack of explanation of the term be-
cause “[t]he term ‘non-economic damages’ is a ‘technical term’ that is not readily understood 
by voters”). SJR8 defines non-economic damages as those “damages that cannot be measured 
in money, including without limitation any loss or damage, however characterized, for pain 
and suffering, mental and emotional distress, loss of life or companionship, or visible result 
of injury.” SJR8, supra note 14, Section 2, § 32(a)(1). 
 47. See supra Part II. 
 48. Historically, 
 
while some tort plaintiffs were capable of paying for legal representation, others 
clearly would not have been able to do so were it not for the judicial sanctioning 
of contingency fee contracts. This innovation opened the doors of justice in most 
jurisdictions to many indigent or working-class plaintiffs in the same mid-
nineteenth century years that civil juries were beginning to award large damages 
to accident victims of corporations. 
 
Karsten, supra note 36, at 243. 
 49. See id. at 244 (noting many innovations of contingency fees “concerned personal 
injury suits”). 
 50. Adam Shajnfeld, A Critical Survey of the Law, Ethics, and Economics of Attorney 
Contingent Fee Arrangements, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 773, 776 (2010). “[S]uch arrange-
ments enable the impecunious to obtain representation. Such persons cannot afford the costs 
of litigation unless and until it is successful. Even members of the middle- and upper-
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These attorneys are not guaranteed any profit unless they win.51 Thus, at the 
outset, lawyers are incentivized to take on cases in which there is a high 
chance of winning (that is, meritorious) and in which the result will be prof-
itable.52 Lawyers will not take cases on a contingency fee basis if there exist 
no legitimate possibilities that they will be rewarded in amounts commensu-
rate with their efforts.53 This is not unscrupulous lawyering; it is simply 
good business. 
A typical contingency fee structure extracts the agreed-upon percentage 
of the jury award from both economic and non-economic damages.54 The 
costs of litigation, like hiring an expert to prove damages, are charged on top 
of this.55 As a hypothetical, say a plaintiff loses his arm in a car accident, 
and the loss of limb prevents him from doing his job. At trial, an expert 
demonstrates that the accident cost $100,000 in medical bills and 
$1,000,000 in lost earnings. The jury additionally awards the plaintiff 
$500,000 in pain and suffering. Assuming a 33.3% contingency fee ar-
rangement, the lawyers would take around $533,333. Thus, of the total $1.6 
million-dollar award, the plaintiff will only receive $1.05 million, leaving 
the plaintiff with less than his actual economic losses by more than 
$100,000. 
As a real-life example, in March of 2017, an Arkansas jury awarded 
$46.5 million in damages to a baby who received permanent brain damage 
at the hands of hospital staff.56 This substantial award may seem like a prac-
tical example of a need for tort reform like SJR8; however, if you dig below 
the numbers, this case actually proves the reverse. At trial, experts testified 
 
socioeconomic classes may find it difficult to pay legal fees in advance of success and collec-
tion of judgment.” Id. 
 51. Id. at 775. 
 52. Id. at 787–88. 
 
Key to understanding contingent fee arrangements is appreciating the concept of 
risk. Generally, contingent fees may exceed hourly fees for the same work be-
cause an attorney must be compensated for accepting the risk that payment will 
be either inadequate for the services performed, or entirely absent. This premium 
is a familiar concept to those in business and finance, where riskier investments 
command higher rates of return than safer ones. 
 
Id. 
 53. Id. at 788 (“Viewed in the aggregate, the attorney is performing a form of redistribu-
tion of costs among clients to ensure that all have adequate representation.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. For a discussion about the subtraction of costs from contingency fee awards, see id. 
at 793–94. 
 56. Press Release, PR Newswire, Arkansas Jury Enters $46.5 Million Verdict for Tod-
dler in Medical Malpractice Case (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/arkansas-jury-enters-465-million-verdict-for-toddler-in-medical-malpractice-case-
300422217.html. 
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that the medical care for the duration of the child’s life would cost $33.7 
million.57 Experts also testified that the baby had an estimated $3.2 million 
in lost earnings.58 Therefore, $9.6 million accounted for the non-economic 
losses. When you subtract the attorneys’ fees (assuming 33.3%) from the 
entire award,59 the family is left with $30.69 million, substantially less than 
would be required to care for their child’s well-being for her prospective 
lifetime. Now, imagine SJR8 were passed and those non-economic damages 
were capped at $500,000. After attorneys’ fees, the family would be left 
with $24.7 million, almost a full $9 million less than the cost of properly 
caring for the child. This amount not only fails to reach the compensation 
necessary to make the family whole again, but may also prohibit the injured 
child from receiving the proper care necessary to sustain life. 
With the limits placed on non-compensatory damages by SJR8, plain-
tiffs who are truly injured, as determined by a jury, will lose a substantial 
portion of their compensatory damages to attorneys’ fees, as demonstrated 
in the hypothetical and case above. Lawyers will also be less likely to take 
on cases that will yield small compensatory damages amounts, no matter 
how meritorious, because the costs of litigation will necessarily exceed the 
amount of the award.60 To this problem, one may argue that the solution is 
not just a cap on non-economic damages but also an additional and more 
stringent cap on attorneys’ fees.61 Yet this solution creates further injustices 
in our market economy. More rigid caps on attorneys’ fees will make more 
cases economically unviable for attorney representation.62 Many deserving 
plaintiffs will have no avenue to seek compensation for their injuries, as 
predicted by the Arkansas Bar Association: 
SJR8 will also result in the courtroom door being closed to many Arkan-
sans. One in four Arkansans live at or below 125% of the federal poverty 
level. SJR8 does not affect those people in Arkansas who can afford to 
pay for legal services. Justice for all necessarily means we must provide 
a system that is open to poor, working poor, and the middle class in our 
state.63 
 
 57. Max Brantley, Jury Awards $46.5 Million in Malpractice Case in Camden, ARK. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2017/03/10/jury-
awards-465-million-in-malpractice-case-in-camden. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See SJR8, supra note 14. 
 60. See Press Release, supra note 56. 
 61. SJR8 already proposes to limit attorneys’ fees to 33.3% of the total award. See SJR8, 
supra note 14. 
 62. Shajnfeld, supra note 50, at 788. 
 63. Press Release, Ark. Bar Ass’n, ArkBar Opposes Senate Joint Resolution 8 (SJR8) 
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.arkbar.com/blogs/denise-hoggard/2017/02/08/arkbar-opposes-
senate-joint-resolution-8-sjr8. 
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Additionally, the rulemaking power provided to the legislature by SJR8 
will compound these problems by making it easier for the legislature to fur-
ther restrict recovery on other tort issues.64 According to the Advance Ar-
kansas Institute, a lobbying group and proponent of SJR8, the purpose of 
this rulemaking power is to enable the legislature to create “loser-pays re-
form” or “class-action reform.”65 These types of reforms will further elimi-
nate access to courts by plaintiffs, and the average Arkansas voter will have 
little say in these legislative reforms. On its face, the rulemaking amendment 
seems unrelated to tort reform, but in actuality, it will have the effect of 
keeping people from their day in court.66 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If one adopts both the Torahic principle that citizens should be justly 
compensated for their injuries, as well as the principle that the Arkansas 
legal system was designed to help ensure a fair process for compensating 
those injuries, SJR8 represents a deviation from these principles by having 
the effect of keeping meritorious claims from reaching the courthouse steps 
and preventing plaintiffs who actually reach the justice system from receiv-
ing the full payment for their injuries. By incorporating SJR8, Arkansas 
voters will be amending the Arkansas constitution in a way that detaches 
itself from the Torahic principles in which it was founded upon and there-
fore ignoring the founders’ original intention. A constitutional amendment 
of this magnitude would fundamentally alter the system of justice in contra-
diction to the fundamental core of the Arkansas constitution. 
 
 64. SJR8, supra note 14, § 3. 
 65. DAN GREENBERG & MARC KILMER, ADVANCE ARKANSAS INSTITUTE, HOW TORT 
REFORM WILL MAKE ARKANSAS HEALTHIER AND WEALTHIER 7 (2017), http://www.
thearkansasproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/tortreformamendment.web_.pdf. 
 66. Closing the Lottery, ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/
21541423 (recognizing that a loser-pays law that sharply decreased suits in Florida was 
quickly repealed with broad support). 
